Emerging from Emergency:  Human Rights in South Africa by Mureinik, Etienne
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 92 Issue 6 
1994 
Emerging from Emergency: Human Rights in South Africa 
Etienne Mureinik 
University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Etienne Mureinik, Emerging from Emergency: Human Rights in South Africa, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1977 (1994). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol92/iss6/43 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
EMERGING FROM EMERGENCY: HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Etienne Mureinik* 
IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S 
STATE OF EMERGENCY. By Stephen Ellmann. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 283. $59. 
Why was it no worse? That is the central question asked by Ste-
phen Ellmann 1 in his thoughtful analysis of the record of the Appel-
late Division2 - South Africa's highest court - under the nationwide 
state of emergency between 1985 and 1990, which we now know to 
have been the dying convulsion of white minority rule and apartheid. 
Ellmann's study spans the tenure of office of two chief justices: 
Pieter Rabie, who vacated office in 1989, and Michael Corbett, who is 
still chief justice. Ellmann's study of this period begins with an analy-
sis of the composition of the Appellate Division during Rabie's tenure, 
while hearing emergency cases (pp. 57-67). The Appellate Division 
sits not en bane but in panels. Civil appeals - all the cases forming 
the main focus of Ellmann's study are civil appeals - are ordinarily 
heard by a panel of five, chosen from a membership that varied in size 
across the high teens during the relevant period. Ellmann shows that 
the panels selected to hear emergency cases under Rabie's chief jus-
ticeship were dominated by merely five judges - a group that in-
cluded Rabie himself (pp. 61-65). This group Ellmann calls the 
"emergency team" (p. 64). Ellmann notes that the emergency team 
commanded a majority of votes in every emergency case decided 
under Rabie and wrote all the principal judgments. When a nonmem-
ber of the team sat on an emergency case and dissented, he never again 
sat on an emergency case during Rabie's tenure (pp. 64-65). 
Ellmann's study of the performance of the Rabie court is largely a 
study of the performance of the emergency team. 
* Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. B.Sc. 1974, LL.B. 
1978, Witwatersrand; B.C.L. 1982, Oxford. - Ed. 
1. Professor of Law, New York Law School. 
2. The Appellate Division was the senior division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. The 
Supreme Court in this context is not the name of a court but a generic expression that encom-
passes several superior courts: the Provincial, Local, and Appellate Divisions of the Supreme 
Court. When In a Time of Trouble was published, the Appellate Division was the highest court 
in South Africa. Under the interim constitution, CoNSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
AFRICA (Act 200 of 1993) [hereinafter S. AFR. CoNST.] - South Africa's first universal 
franchise constitution - which came fully into operation on April 27, 1994, S. AFR. CoNST. 
§ 251, the new Constitutional Court is to supplant the Appellate Division as the highest court on 
questions of constitutional law. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 7. 
1977 
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Rabie's retirement spelled the demise of the emergency team. 
Under Corbett, panels to decide emergency cases were drawn from the 
Appellate Division as a whole (pp. 159-60). The result was a distinctly 
different jurisprudence. 
Three judgments, as Ellmann shows, typify the work of Rabie's 
emergency team (pp. 71-114). The first is Minister of Law & Order v. 
Dempsey, 3 in which habeas corpus was sought to obtain the release of 
a nun detained under the emergency regulations for attempting forci-
bly to restrain a policeman who, in the course of dispersing a funeral 
gathering, was assaulting one of the mourners. South African law had 
long accepted that every invasion of personal liberty is prima facie 
unlawful and calls for justification and, consequently, that the burden 
of justifying a detention rests on the detainer. Despite that, the court 
ruled .that the burden of proving that the detainer had abused his dis-
cretion - a discretion the proper exercise of which was essential to 
the validity of the detention - lay on the applicant for habeas corpus. 4 
The second judgment is Omar v. Minister of Law & Order. 5 South 
African law contains authority for a doctrine conferring special pro-
tection on fundamental rights against invasion by delegated legisla-
tion. The doctrine generates a rule that vitiates any exercise of a 
delegated legislative competence if it destroys a fundamental right, un-
less the destruction is specifically envisaged and authorized by the em-
powering provision. 6 Despite that, in Omar the Appellate Division 
upheld regulations, enacted under general emergency powers and 
without specific authority, that deprived emergency detainees of their 
right of access to counsel and their right to be heard before a decision 
to prolong the detention. Both of these rights had often, and in vari-
ous contexts, been characterized as fundamental. 
The third judgment is Staatspresident v. United Democratic Front, 7 
which departed from precedent to interpret the emergency legislation 
as ousting the jurisdiction of the courts to review emergency regula-
tions for vagueness. The effect was to insulate regulations profoundly 
invasive of basic liberties from judicial review. 
After a rigorous analysis of these three judgments, Ellmann con-
cludes that the Rabie court "responded to human rights issues in ways 
that fell painfully short of carefully reasoned adjudication: with ill-
explained doctrinal interpretation or development, with abrupt or even 
deaf responses to opposing arguments, and on occasion with startling 
3. 1988 (3) S.A. 19. 
4. 1988 (3) S.A. at 39. 
5. 1987 (3) S.A. 859. 
6. See, for instance, Mandela v. Minister of Prisons, 1983 (1) S.A. 938, as explained in 
Katofa v. Administrator-General, 1985 (4) S.A. 211, 217, 225 (S.W.A.); Regina v. Slabbert, 1956 
(4) S.A. 18 (f.P.D.); and Etienne Mureinik, Fundamental Rights and Delegated Legislation, 1 S. 
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 111 (1985). 
7. 1988 (4) S.A. 830. 
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recasting of existing doctrine" (p. 113). But against these judgments 
and their ilk - which were responsible for the reputation for defer-
ence to the security forces that the Rabie court earned during the 
emergency - Ellmann sets other features of the record of the court. 
One is the court's punctilious insistence, admittedly largely at the level 
of dictum, on preserving the nominal jurisdiction of the court to re-
view emergency action (pp. 90-91, 116). Another is the effort of the 
Rabie court, made in the teeth of hostile emergency regulations, to 
preserve the rights of emergency detainees to testify in court in sup-
port of applications for relief from the authorities (pp. 120-28). Both 
features entailed a departure from existing doctrine in order to protect 
the subjects of emergency rule. 
The less-than-monolithic character of the record of the Rabie 
court drives Ellmann to conclude that, although the court accepted 
the genuineness of the emergency, trusted the good faith of the state 
and its senior officials, and had a sympathetic attitude toward the bur-
dens carried by law enforcement officers (p. 131 ), it genuinely disap-
proved of abuse and remained committed to preserving both a legal 
order and its own institutional role (p. 135). 
Even given these qualifications to the record of Rabie's emergency 
team, however, the Corbett court's record is palpably better. The Cor-
bett court was willing to strike down restrictions imposed on an emer-
gency detainee's freedom of speech, movement, and association as a 
condition of his release,8 to set aside a press censorship order,9 to up-
hold habeas corpus, 10 and to overrule Dempsey. 11 Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, the court took important steps to shift the burden of 
justifying a detention back onto the authorities12 and substantially to 
widen the class of administrative decisions that cannot be taken with-
out a prior hearing. 13 But the Corbett court was unwilling to overrule 
United Democratic Front, 14 and it did not go as far in restoring the 
authorities' burden of justifying a detention as principle required. 15 
Generally, Ellmann detects a "reluctance to alter too visibly or too 
quickly the work of the Rabie court" (p. 157). Fidelity to precedent, 
says Ellmann, retarded the flowering under Corbett of human rights 
8. Visagie v. State President, 1989 (3) S.A. 859, 870-71. 
9. Minister of Law & Order v. Argus Printing & Publishing Co., 1990 (1) S.A. 1058, 1067. 
10. Minister van Wet en Orde v. Matshoba, 1990 (1) S.A. 280; Minister of Law & Order, 
KwaNdebele v. Mathebe, 1990 (1) S.A. 114, 117. 
11. P. 142; see During NO v. Boesak, 1990 (3) S.A. 661, 663. 
12. Matshoba, 1990 (1) S.A. at 280; Boesak, 1990 (3) S.A. at 663-66. 
13. Administrator, Transvaal v. Traub, 1989 (4) S.A. 731. This judgment was not given in 
an emergency case, but it had substantial implications for emergency law and contributed to a 
climate of closer scrutiny of emergency action. 
14. Catholic Bishops Publishing Co. v. State President, 1990 (1) S.A. 849, 866. 
15. See Evadne Grant & Etienne Mureinik, Administrative Law, in 1990 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. 
L. 587, 607. 
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claims (p. 158). Despite that, Ellmann concludes that the Corbett 
court worked, "not a velvet revolution, but surely a velvet reform" (p. 
141). 
All of which propels Ellmann to his central question: Why was it 
not all so much worse (p. 163)? Why was the Rabie court not unre-
mittingly hostile to human rights, and what was it about South Afri-
can legal culture that left room for the Corbett court at all? What kept 
some legal protection for human rights alive during the dismal days of 
emergency rule? Why was the performance of the Appellate Division 
so much better than that of the German courts under Nazi rule? Why 
did it never degenerate, as it has under other autocratic regimes, into 
"justice by phone," with courts taking instructions directly from the 
executive (p. 171 & n.45)? 
Ellmann's answer is that despite the pervasive injustice of 
apartheid and the routine resort to extralegal methods in its defense, 
South African whites continued, for a mixture of admirable and less-
than-admirable reasons, to value and adhere to law. Ellmann identi-
fies three reasons for that adherence: law's utility as a method of con-
trol, whites' belief in law as a means of legitimizing their rule, and 
whites' sincere belief in the value of law. Each of these reasons, says 
Ellmann, contributed to a climate in which the courts were likely to 
impose, and the government likely to endure, some legal limits on 
emergency powers (pp. 174-93). 
To account for the superior performance of the Corbett court, 
Ellmann adds to this explanation an analysis of the role of South Afri-
can lawyers and judges as "carriers of a human rights tradition even in 
the long years when dominant white opinion gave that tradition short 
shrift" (p. 205). In Ellmann's view, three forces at work in the South 
African legal community helped to sustain the human rights tradition 
during Nationalist rule: the personal prestige of many of the lawyers 
and judges committed to the tradition, the independence of the bar, 16 
and the - somewhat unevenly observed - tradition of judicial inde-
pendence (pp. 226-30). These forces were aided, so Ellmann argues, 
16. Here Ellmann mainly uses the bar, not in the American sense, but in the English and 
South African sense, to mean the advocates (barristers), who enjoy unrestricted rights of audi-
ence in all the courts, as opposed to the attorneys (solicitors), who do not generally enjoy rights 
of appearance in the Supreme Court and have to instruct advocates when a case is litigated there. 
The bar in this narrow sense represents a mere fraction of the legal profession - a group that 
stands somewhat aloof from society and prides itself on its elite status. Supreme Court judges are 
at present drawn from the ranks of the senior bar. 
It is the traditions of the bar in this narrow sense with which Ellmann primarily credits 
support for the South African human rights tradition. Pp. 214-25. This conclusion drives 
Ellmann to argue that "[t]he spirit of independence of bench and bar in South Africa seems 
linked to a sense of membership in a prestigious elite, charged with the special duty, and seen as 
graced with the special ability, to stand somewhat apart from society,'' and that "[i]f we want to 
structure a legal profession for the worst of times ••. then we may well need to grant some degree 
of inegalitarian status and authority to the legal profession." P. 246. Many ofEllmann's readers 
may find these conclusions controversial and disturbing. 
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by the fact that "the human rights tradition . in South Africa fitted 
quite comfortably with the positivist jurisprudence which has long 
held sway, and with the principle of parliamentary supremacy which 
is its central dictate."17 
Ellmann's analysis is based on an encyclopedic reading of the 
South African literature, legal and other, and his perceptions weave a 
rich fabric of subtle insight. South African lawyers will learn much 
about their legal traditions from Ellmann's delicate account; indeed, 
they will learn much about their country. Most South Africans will be 
startled to discover that Ellmann has spent weeks rather than years in 
South Africa itself. In a Time of Trouble is consequently a book that 
deserves to be read, not summarized, and the outline here of 
Ellmann's argument reveals little of its depth. 
Some of Ellmann's conclusions will of course be controversial. 
Possibly the most controversial, because of what it teaches about the 
future of South African law and culture, is Ellmann's suggestion that 
South African jurisprudence, because of what he considers its "positiv-
ist" character, made South African law amenable to human rights 
arguments. 
What is certainly true, as Ellmann points out, is that South Afri-
can human rights lawyers are skilled at framing human rights argu-
ments in the language of prevailing doctrine. "[P]rinciples which the 
powerful insist on for their own protection may begin to creep into the 
law of the powerless," says Ellmann (p. 245). He continues: 
Doctrines shaped in decisions about the ordinary lives of whites inevita-
bly are capable of application in other contexts as well. Not to apply 
these rules more generally may be hard to justify logically, and if such 
doctrines are generally applied, then courts cannot rework them too 
sharply in any one context without risking injury to other aspects of the 
social order that powerful interests protect. [pp. 175-76] 
South African human rights lawyers have become astute at exploiting 
the protective potential of general doctrines - at demanding that the 
courts acknowledge the entailments and implications for human rights 
of doctrines first adopted for very different purposes.18 
All this may, as Ellmann suggests, distinguish contemporary South 
African human rights lawyers from the antebellum lawyers who 
sought to protect slaves from the fugitive laws. Ellmann seems to say 
that the sharpness of the challenge that antebellum lawyers offered to 
prevailing doctrine made it more difficult than it might have been for 
judges hostile to slavery to accept that that doctrine permitted pro-
slave decisions (pp. 236-38). Most South African human rights law-
17. P. 205; see also pp. 231-44. 
18. South African human rights lawyers have become astute, in other words, at realizing the 
power of the idea Dworkin calls "integrity." See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LA W'S EMPIRE 
(1986). 
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yers eschewed this kind of approach. Instead, they took principles al-
ready judicially recognized and tried to develop them and reorient 
them in service of human rights. Before the Corbett court - and, for 
that matter, the lower superior courts - they were often successful. 
It is one thing, however, to say that "South African lawyers have 
chosen to speak in their courts in terms of the dominant jurisprudence, 
and to use respectful tones when they do so,"19 or even to commend 
them for that strategy;20 it is quite another to say that "the resources 
available within South African law for benign decisions can readily be 
fitted into a positivist framework."21 It is yet another to say that 
widespread adherence to positivist argumentation in South African 
courts has also made a contribution to the rise of more rights-minded 
decisions. It has done so by providing an agreed-upon framework for 
argument, within which a considerable range of human rights conten-
tions can be presented as legitimate grounds for decision. And it has 
been able to offer this opportunity in good part because the central posi-
tivist dictate of South African law, the supremacy of Parliament, has 
proved to be a relatively unconfining doctrinal constraint. [p. 233] 
These conclusions will puzzle many South Africans. Most South Afri-
can human rights lawyers would say that the human rights tradition 
survives in their country despite positivism, not because of it. They 
would also suggest that parliamentary supremacy is only as flexible a 
principle as it is because human rights lawyers have fought the older 
conception of that principle with doctrines designed to hold Parlia-
ment to its democratic responsibilities. It is true that the challenge 
posed by human rights lawyers has made the principle of parliamen-
tary supremacy contested terrain and has consequently made it ame-
nable to a wider range of interpretations than it used to be. It is true 
also that the principle's amenability to new interpretations has in tum 
prised open the prevailing jurisprudence and made it more "supple" 
than it used to be (pp. 246-47). But South African human rights law-
yers would no doubt question whether that makes it instructive to give 
credit for their work to parliamentary supremacy and positivist 
jurisprudence. 
All of which makes one wonder exactly which of the many senses 
of positivism Ellmann means to employ here and whether it is very 
helpful to employ any. It may be that what is at stake in the judicial 
record that Ellmann studies is not so much a contest between positiv-
ism - or one of the various positivisms - and any of its Anglo-
American theoretical rivals but a perhaps cruder struggle: one be-
tween lawyers who believe that law is about authority and lawyers 
19. P. 247; see also' p. 238. 
20. Ellmann concludes: "When courtroom victories seem possible and worth seeking ••• 
South African experience suggests that lawyers' hoary strategy of staying within the shelter of 
established doctrine and precedent is a wise one." P. 247. 
21. P. 238; see also p. 244. 
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who believe that law should strive to foster the justification of 
decisions. 
Such a struggle does seem to be visible in the record that Ellmann 
studies. Take, for instance, the three cases that typify the oeuvre of the 
Rabie court. 22 In Dempsey, the applicant for habeas corpus sought to 
establish that it was for the authorities to justify an emergency deten-
tion by showing that their discretion had been exercised properly. The 
court ruled that it was for the applicant to show abuse of discretion. 
In United Democratic Front, the applicants tried to bring emergency 
regulations under judicial scrutiny for vagueness. The court held that 
the governing legislation ousted judicial review. In Omar, the appli-
cants asserted two procedural rights on behalf of emergency detainees: 
the right to be heard before the detention was prolonged and the right 
of access to counsel. Both those rights would have drawn the authori-
ties into the exercise of justifying their decisions about detainees. The 
court denied both rights asserted. 
In all these cases, the applicants were trying to establish principles 
that would have required of the authorities closer justification of their 
decisions than the court was willing to countenance. In each case the 
court steered a path through doctrine supportive of the principles ad-
vanced and reached a decision that had the effect of putting the au-
thorities in a position to decide without justifying. 
It is precisely because the Corbett court did the opposite that its 
jurisprudence is superior. That court took important steps to shift the 
burden of justifying a detention back onto the authorities, and it sub-
stantially widened the class of administrative decisions that cannot be 
made without a prior hearing. These are the Corbett court's central 
contributions, and they both conduce to the better justification of deci-
sions. Nor does this essential difference between the Corbett court and 
the Rabie court stop at outcome: it is palpable also in the method of 
adjudication. The emergency judgments of the Corbett court were 
generally fully and usually persuasively reasoned. The judgments of 
the emergency team, as Ellmann notes, were characterized by method 
that "fell painfully short of carefully reasoned adjudication: with ill-
explained doctrinal interpretation or development, with abrupt or even 
deaf responses to opposing arguments" {p. 113). 
These are not accidental features of the contrast between the Rabie 
court and the Corbett court. Perhaps the deepest struggle in contem-
porary South African jurisprudence is between lawyers who think that 
the job of law is done when decisions are made by officials wielding 
authority and lawyers who think that the law should strive for deci-
sions that are justified. Indeed, the deepest divide in South African 
22. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. 
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culture generally may well be between people who are content with 
authority and people who aspire to justification. 
It is natural that it should be so, for this is a divide close to the 
fault line between friends of apartheid and its enemies; it helps explain 
what has been most offensive about apartheid and why South Africans 
expect their new constitution to cure the offensiveness. 
Practitioners of apartheid over the years were often surprised, or 
often professed to be surprised, by the intensity of the reaction, espe-
cially the international reaction, that their practices excited. They 
pointed to other governments that practiced systematic and dire injus-
tice, and they asked what made apartheid special and why its practi-
tioners merited being singled out for censure and sanction. The 
answer was usually that apartheid was unique in systematically em-
bodying racial discrimination in institutional form, and especially in 
legal form, and that that made it peculiarly detestable. I believe this 
answer to be correct, but I think that it is useful to develop it. 
When we ask why racial discrimination is repellent, we frequently 
note that differentiation by criteria other than race is often acceptable, 
desirable, or necessary. That requires us to ask how we may distin-
guish between tolerable discrimination and intolerable discrimination 
- or, since the word discrimination has come itself to connote the 
intolerable, between discrimination and differentiation. The answer, it 
seems, we can state with no greater precision than this: intolerable 
discrimination is differentiation that is not justified, and tolerable dis-
crimination is differentiation that is justified. By justified I mean sim-
ply that the arguments for differentiation, taken together, are better 
than the arguments against differentiation, taken together; and by un-
justified I mean that the arguments against are better than those for.23 
It may be, then, that the most objectionable feature of apartheid 
was the systematic use of the law to treat people differently without 
justification. For lawyers who believe that the central aspiration of 
law is to strive for the ever better justification of decisions,24 this char-
acteristic put apartheid into mortal conflict with law itself. That aspi-
ration, for such lawyers, is why judges, in contrast to officers of the 
other organs of government, invest so much effort in reasoning their 
judgments. It is also why the law, in court, insists upon the right to be 
heard and the right to proper consideration and why, in South Africa 
23. As some people think that discrimination on the ground of race is never justified, racial 
discrimination is sometimes said to be intolerable in any circumstance. This latter proposition, 
however, is crude, because it depends upon the relatively recent linguistic development by which 
racial discrimination has come to connote only that racial discrimination that is unjustified. The 
truth is that some racial discrimination - namely, appropriate affirmative action - is justified. 
Indeed, the distinction between racial discrimination, as that term is most commonly used, and 
affirmative action, properly so called, is the distinction between racial differentiation that is un-
justified and racial differentiation that is justified. Thus, intolerable discrimination - or racial 
discrimination in the pejorative sense - is unjustified differentiation. 
24. See DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 229. 
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and elsewhere, the law has for some time been engaged in extending 
these rights to new spheres of extracurial governmental decisionmak-
ing, for they are rights in service of the better justification of decisions. 
The aspiration to better justification, for those lawyers, is the reason 
for the international trend toward review of administrative decision-
making for unreasonableness, for an unreasonable. decision is one 
without a plausible justification. The aspirati9n to better justification 
is the reason, too, why trial by ordeal, an irrational procedure, was 
abandoned in favor of trial by jury, a more rational one. It is perhaps 
also the reason why trial by a jury, which offers no reasons for its 
decisions, has yielded in many places to trial by a judge, who can be 
made to give reasons. The whole trend of progressive legal develop-
ment is toward the better justification of decisions and toward proce-
dures that conduce to the better justification of decisions. How, then, 
lawyers who share this aspiration might ask, could racial discrimina-
tion, the defining feature of which is that it is not justified, have flour-
ished in a system that prided itself, as Ellmann shows, on its adherence 
to law? 
What was crucial was the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament 
- and crucial despite its relative permeability, to which Ellmann 
draws attentio_n. It was that doctrine that immunized the apartheid 
statutes, and the bulk of what was done under them, from judicial 
challenge. But the first instinct of a lawyer, those who aspire to justi-
fied decisions would say, should be to ask what justified the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy itself. In another country the answer would 
have been that Parliament represented the people and that its repre-
sentativeness brought into play some version of democracy. We may 
consider the version of democracy thus invoked an austere one, but it 
would have been something by way of a defensible theory to justify the 
doctrine. 
In South Africa, however, Parliament was manifestly unrepresent-
ative, and it was plain to all reasonable and honest people that no 
plausible version of democracy could be adduced to support the doc-
trine of parliamentary supremacy. Despite that, the doctrine of parlia-
mentary supremacy remained the ultimate legal justification. Racial 
discrimination - that is, differentiation distinguished by its unjus-
tifiability - was perpetrated systematically under color of a constitu-
tional doctrine itself incapable of justification. Racial discrimination 
flourished in law because the legal system plainly declared its own ulti-
mate foundation to be beyond the need for justification, and it conse-
quently announced that the enterprise of justification itself was 
unimportant. 
This result was possible because lawyers, collectively, suspended 
inquiry into the justification of parliamentary supremacy. Judges, 
even those who abhorred racism and acknowledged the illegitimacy of 
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the constitution, took parliamentary supremacy for granted. Practic-
ing lawyers, even radical ones, assumed parliamentary supremacy to 
be beyond legal challenge. Law teachers, even those whose lives were 
dedicated to denouncing injustice and teaching the virtues of constitu-
tionalism, reared graduates who entered the profession entirely recon-
ciled to living and working and thinking in a system of justification 
whose ultimate justification could not be justified. 
So the South African legal system rested upon the negation of what 
might be considered the central aspiration of law: the pursuit of ever-
better justification for decisions. In a flourishing legal culture, so law-
yers who aspire to foster an ethic of justification might say, the doc-
trine of parliamentary supremacy, and a great deal done under it, 
would routinely have been challenged at law for want of justification. 
What is more, the challenge would have been repeated until it became 
clear to all that this doctrine and its consequences were incompatible 
with the enterprise of law. In fact, most South African lawyers took 
the doctrine as beyond challenge just because it was upheld by author-
itative bodies. The citation of authority supplanted the pursuit of jus-
tification. Authority triumphed over justification.25 
All this explains why South African human rights lawyers have 
long been looking to a bill of rights to drive apartheid out, or at least 
to succeed it. They have been hoping to find, in a bill of rights, not 
just the quietus to parliamentary supremacy, but also a set of princi-
ples against which to test the justification of laws and decisions. And 
they have been hoping that the necessity of justifying any law or deci-
sion challenged under a bill of rights would invigorate the enterprise 
itself of seeking justification. They have been looking to a bill of 
rights, not merely to annul the kinds of statutes that made iniquity 
possible, but to rid the legal system of the authoritarian ways of mind 
that made apartheid possible. They have been looking to it, not only 
for its explicit content, but also to enrich law by fostering justification-
thinking, because it was the poverty of law, in the shape of pervasive 
authority-thinking, that made apartheid possible. A bill of rights, they 
have been hoping, would restore discipline to a legal system grown 
slothful about justification. 
So the story of recent South African law is largely the story of a 
struggle between a culture of authority and a culture of justification. 
Under the Rabie court the culture of authority held sway; under Cor-
bett the culture of justification achieved a substantial recovery. The 
latest victory for the culture of justification was the adoption, as part 
25. Because the ethic of justification was so weak, other manifestly unjustified practices, such 
as discrimination against women and gays, also often passed without effective challenge. 
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of the interim constitution,26 of the new Bill of Rights.27 The victory, 
however, was not a decisive one. Indeed, the struggle continued dur-
ing the drafting of the Bill of Rights, and each side won ground in the 
final text. Supporters of a culture of justification won constitutional 
guarantees of diversity of opinion in the state-controlled media, 28 of 
judicial review,29 of written reasons for administrative action,3o of 
"justifiable"31 and procedurally fair administrative action,32 and of ac-
cess to official information. 33 But opponents of justification succeeded 
in imposing important limitations on the right to official information34 
and in deleting wording that would have made it clear that common 
law rules governing private relations are in principle amenable to con-
stitutional review.35 They succeeded also in winning special immuni-
26. It is only an interim constitution because it gives the two houses of Parliament elected 
under it, sitting together as the Constitutional Assembly, the function of writing the final consti-
tution. S. AFR. CoNsr. ch. 5. 
27. s. AFR. CoNsr. ch. 3. 
28. Section 15(2) of the Constitution reads: "All media financed by or under the control of 
the state shall be regulated in a manner which ensures impartiality and the expression of a diver-
sity of opinion." S. AFR. CoNsr. § 15(2). 
29. Section 24(a) is particularly important, because it seems to outlaw ouster clauses of the 
kind upheld in United Democratic Front. It reads: "Every person shall have the right to lawful 
administrative action where any of his or her rights or interests is affected or threatened." S. 
AFR. CoNsr. § 24(a); see also S. AFR. CoNsr. §§ 4, 7, 22. 
30. Section 24(c) reads: "Every person shall have the right to be furnished with reasons in 
writing for administrative action which affects any of his or her rights or interests unless the 
reasons for such action have been made public." S. AFR. CoNsr. § 24(c). 
31. Section 24(d) reads: "Every person shall have the right to administrative action which is 
justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it where any of his or her rights is affected or 
threatened." S. AFR. CoNsr. § 24(d). 
32. Section 24(b) reads: "Every person shall have the right to procedurally fair administra-
tive action where any of his or her rights or legitimate expectations is affected or threatened." S. 
AFR. CoNST. § 24(b). 
33. See S. AFR. CoNST. § 23. 
34. Section 23 reads: "Every person shall have the right of access to all information held by 
the state or any of its organs at any level of government in so far as such information is required 
for the exercise or protection of any of his or her rights." S. AFR. CoNST. § 23. The force of the 
qualification in the last part of the section is unclear. The fear is that it may be read as reducing 
the right to something little more than a right ancillary to litigation - little more, perhaps, than 
a constitutional guarantee of discovery. 
35. The committee that drafted the Bill of Rights proposed the following wording: 
The provisions of this Chapter shall -
(a) bind the legislative, executive and, where appropriate, the judicial branches of govern-
ment at all levels as well as all statutory bodies and functionaries; 
(b) bind, where just and equitable, other bodies and persons .... 
Technical Comm. on Fundamental Rights During the Transition, Seventh Progress Report 1 
(July 29, 1993) (on file with author). In the final version, § 7(1) replaced this formulation, so that 
the provision now reads, "This Chapter shall bind all legislative and executive organs of state at 
all levels of government." S. AFR. CoNsr. § 7(1). 
The new wording invites South African courts to follow the reasoning of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573. There the court, construing a similar provision in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, reasoned, in effect, that that provision requires the presence of a legislative 
or an executive element and, consequently, that common law rules governing private relations 
are not amenable to constitutional review unless one of the private parties relies on allegedly 
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ties from review to protect cherished institutions. 36 
The struggle between authority and justification will certainly be 
carried forward into the interpretation of South Africa's new constitu-
tion and, for that matter, into the reconstruction of the social order. 
The culture of authority has sunk deep roots into South African think-
ing, and it will not be easy to dig them out. Contributions such as 
Ellmann's In a Time of Trouble, because of their penetrating analysis 
and perceptive insight, are of invaluable assistance to South Africans 
who are trying to cultivate a vigorous ethic of justification. 
unconstitutional legislation. The South African courts are of course not bound by Canadian 
jurisprudence, and there are other provisions in the South African Constitution that bear on the 
question. See, e.g., S. AFR. CoNsr. §§ 4(2), 7(2), 33(2). It is less clear now, however, than it 
would have been under the Technical Committee's formulation, which was rejected deliberately, 
that common law rules governing private relations can be brought under constitutional scrutiny. 
36. Section 33(5)(a) reads: ''The provisions of a law in force at the commencement of this 
Constitution promoting fair employment practices, orderly and equitable collective bargaining 
and the regulation of industrial action shall remain of full force and effect until repealed or 
amended by the legislature." S. AFR. CoNsr. § 33(5)(a). This provision was intended to insulate 
existing labor legislation from constitutional review. How successfully it captures that intention 
is controversial. 
Section 14(3) reads: 
Nothing in this Chapter [the Bill of Rights] shall preclude legislation recognising -
(a) a system of personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular reli-
gion; and 
(b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law subject to specified 
procedures. 
S. AFR. CoNsr. § 14(3). These provisions apparently envisage putting practices authorized by 
religious law which discriminate on the ground of gender - such as polygynous marriages and 
discriminatory rules of succession - beyond challenge under the equality clause. S. AFR. 
CoNsr. § 8. 
